Introduction: A Revolution in Tropes by Sutton, Jane S & Mifsud, Mari Lee
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Rhetoric and Communication Studies Faculty
Publications Rhetoric and Communication Studies
2015
Introduction: A Revolution in Tropes
Jane S. Sutton
Mari Lee Mifsud
University of Richmond, mmifsud@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/rhetoric-faculty-publications
Part of the Rhetoric Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Rhetoric and Communication Studies at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Rhetoric and Communication Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sutton, Jane S., and Mari Lee Mifsud. "Introduction: A Revolution in Tropes." In A Revolution in Tropes: Alloiostrophic Rhetoric, xi-xxvii.
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015.
Introduction 
A Revolution in Tropes 
Jane S. Sutton and Mari Lee Mifsud 
When you change the way you look at things, the things you look at change -
MaxPlank 1 
Our view of tropes is that they are rhetoric's own unique resources, but for 
ineluctable historiographical reasons have been more or less closed off from 
the production of theory. Our "trope project" began simply enough. If the 
workings of tropes could be identified in a new way, then the aim and 
purpose of rhetoric could be retheorized in terms new to democratic delibera-
tion. Working under the slogan "Yes, tropes-but all of them," 2 we at-
tempted a new classification system based on the Greek roots of hundreds of 
tropes listed in various old and new sources such as Bernard Dupriez's A 
Dictionary of Literary Devices, A-Z and Richard Lanham's A Handlist of 
Rhetorical Tenns, respectively. 
Our suggestion led us to create charts of tropes. Eventually after several 
starts, we organized a heck of a lot of tropes in relation to their function 
specified by their root domain. Metaphor fell under the category of the root 
phora; anastrophe under strophe; and antimetabole under bole. The work 
was tedious. We quit working on it from time to time. Our trope project 
seemed to be getting us closer and closer to just compiling pages and pages 
of excel spreadsheets, but all the while farther from our question, how do 
tropes work? 
One day, unexpectedly, we discovered through our root work that a con-
nection exists between the trope antistrophe and katastrophe. 3 Bascially, 
katastrophe is a subset of antistrophe which effectively binds them uniquely. 
The binding sequence appears in Aristotle's Rhetoric and functions in a static 
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model straight away to originate and uphold a theory of civic discourse. 
When we recognized this, we were stunned and began down another route. 
We are jumping ahead of ourselves. We should start over, at the very begin-
ning. 
When we met some twenty years ago, Jane, writing on the history and 
theory of rhetoric, was immersed in the study of Aristotle's Physics. Mari 
Lee, a doctoral student in rhetoric, wondered why. She learned that Jane was 
trying to figure something out about Aristotle's view of contingency in rheto-
ric. Jane was finding from Aristotle's idea of an earth at rest that his rhetoric 
was not only built for a polis but also that it was designed in the earth's 
model. That is, Rhetoric, the polis, and the earth are interconnected. In one of 
our first conversations, we found ourselves astonished as we recognized that, 
to the extent that Rhetoric is influenced by Aristotle's desire to bring a 
people to rest, Aristotle's rhetorical theory is an art of denying contingency 
rather than affirming it in civic life. 
We both remember how alienating our exchanges were. That contingency 
is the heart of Aristotle's Rhetoric is akin to a first principle of rhetorical 
studies. How could rhetoric be an art of denying rather than affirming contin-
gency? And what would this mean for future rhetorical theorizing? 
As we ventured into the question of contingency, it became an object of 
study with respect to both rhetorical theory and the history of rhetoric. We 
began at the beginning, the first line of Aristotle's Rhetoric: "Rhetoric is the 
counterpart [antistrophos] to dialectic." 4 Our first lesson in analyzing rheto-
ric's relation with dialectic is that rhetoric is prefigured by the trope 
antistrophe. The resulting insight into the "tropics'' of Rhetoric led to our 
recognition that rhetoric's antistrophic relationship with dialectic is not neu-
tral,5 and we wondered how antistrophe functioned in Aristotle's construc-
tion of contingency. 
We situated antistrophe in a particular construction of contingency, 
namely one oriented toward bringing people to a rest in accordance with 
Aristotle's rational account of change in his model of the earth. We discov-
ered that when paired with contingency, particular tropes provide an inter-
ested way of making contact with the other. The trope antistrophe entails a 
unique tropical style called katastrophe wherein the activity of turning 
(strophe) down (kata) the other occurs. Within this configuration, the slave, 
the barbarian, the alien, the stranger, and women embody aspects of contin-
gency related to an unnatural change that rhetoric has expunged in its anti-
strophic model to dialectic. As Aristotle puts it, the most appropriate trope 
for stylizing antistrophic rhetoric is "katastrophe," quite literally a style that 
"turns down" other possible meanings so that a single one can be settled 
upon by "all, or the majority, or the wise" among us. 6 While we certainly see 
the value and significance of the majority in the conceptual context ofrhetor-
ical theory, we also see something else. We see how contact is configured in 
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antistrophic rhetoric also creates a way of turning down the other in an effort 
to achieve a single resting place settled upon by "all, or the majority, or the 
wise" among us. We wonder where the rhetorical theory is for unsettling this 
resting place when it turns out to be a place of oppression for others? 
The question how might rhetoric make contact with difference? creates a 
responsibility to discover how the art systemically excludes the other, and 
then based on that knowledge, to provide not only the resources but also the 
means for theorizing rhetoric anew to meet the demands of civic engagement 
that it is called to perfonn in the contemporary world. Eventually, our trope 
project-our enonnous number of excel spreadsheets-took us down a route, 
mostly esoteric. Then once again and unexpectedly we stumbled upon a trope 
whose orientation is the other-alloi6sis. 
And so we pursued the trope of the other. We ventured even further 
beyond the tropes contained within the Rhetoric and even traditional 
historiography, and now offer another trope, one of the other-alloi6sis. 
Could this trope be figured with contingency so as to create new relations 
with the other? What would the trope of the other mean for future rhetorical 
theorizing? As should be apparent by now-after hearing about our attempts 
at creating a new classification system of tropes-we will barely scratch the 
surface of an enormous tropological terrain as we try to present possible 
ways for this to happen. Nevertheless, we theorize that rhetoric can cease 
being reductive if other tropes can emerge. For starters, such tropes could 
come out of the discovery that the concept of contingency built on a principle 
of rest has distorted perceptions of contact, the other, and authority and turn 
us otherwise. 
This book presents a collection of sorts of the conversations we have had 
across two decades of working together. A small part of our conversations 
has seen the light of day in earlier published essays, from which we draw in 
this book As our conversation evolved over the years, it began to extend 
beyond our interpersonal dyad to include others. In this volume, we are 
joined by Michele Kennerly and Marie-Odile N. Hobeika to explore alloios-
trophic rhetorical history, theory, and practice. In what follows in this Intro-
duction, we wish to give you, our readers, a fuller sense of why we write, 
where we are coming from, what we collectively offer in this volume, and 
where we aim to go. 
Because a new approach to rhetorical theorizing comes out of the discov-
ery that assumptions regarding contingency have distorted perceptions of 
how rhetoric functions in the civic realm, then questions of democracy and 
rhetoric's relation to its ideals and practices must be engaged. Democracy is, 
after all, why rhetoric is claimed to have been theorized by Aristotle in the 
first place. In the civic realm, Aristotle affinned that we can never know 
essentially or necessarily, only ever probabilistically, because the contingen-
cies of civic life are too great. So, the story goes, he theorized an art of 
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rhetoric to train our deliberation and decision making in the condition of 
contingency to produce wise practical judgments, decisions that are likely to 
be best for the greater good. If rhetoric takes as its effect the denial of 
contingency, what hope for democracy have we? 
This traditional narrative affirming the centrality of contingency in Aris-
totle's rhetorical theory is conjoined with a mythic resonance of rhetoric 
being a gift from Zeus. The story goes something like this: The people-
demos (from which the English word democracy is derived)-were living 
like animals. 7 Without civilization they "at first lived scattered ... there were 
no cities." 8 The people had fire; they had ways to get food; they could build 
houses. What they did not have was a way to settle their differences. When-
ever "they formed communities," they would resort to violence since the 
people lacked a way of making decisions. 9 For Zeus the people's violence 
was wrecking his idea of people living peacefully. Zeus wanted to create 
civilization. So Zeus asked one of his lackeys-the god Hermes also known 
as Mercury-to distribute rhetoric among the people. The gift of rhetoric 
would enable the demos to settle their differences by means of speech rather 
than by means of violence. How should we distribute this art? Hermes asked 
Zeus. "Shall I," inquired Hermes, the god of rhetoric, "distribute [the art] in 
the same way that the arts have been distributed? For example, one physician 
is enough to treat many laymen, and it is the same with other craftsmen." 10 In 
other words, should rhetoric-the power to speak-be distributed to only a 
few? Zeus thought for a moment. Give rhetoric to everyone, Zeus said, and 
distribute its power equally. Zeus explained to Hermes that civilization 
would not come into being if only a few shared the art. It is said that democ-
racy was born the day that rhetoric was distributed as a gift to all the people. 
Rhetoric shapes democracy because, insofar as it offers people-demos-a 
tool, it enables them to conduct the business ofliving together. 
From the vision of everyone receiving rhetoric emerges the impression of 
equality. Since all were given rhetoric then all can speak; all can participate 
in the deliberative process and make decisions about what to do. Yet, we 
know this same mythic scene finds Penelope being shouted at by her son 
Telemachus when she, according to him, dared violate the norms of speaking 
culture by instructing the Bard Phemius to sing another song than the all-too-
sad one of her husband Odysseus. Telemachus makes quite a scene shaming 
his mother for speaking, as such action is to be taken only by men. 11 And we 
know too from this mythic scene that when Lysistrata attempts to make her 
great speech on why the Spartans and Athenians should make peace rather 
than continue their warring, the Magistrates leer at Lysistrata's body, and jeer 
at her for thinking she has any place speaking on matters that are men's.12 
We know as well that Cassandra, a truth speaker, was dismissed as a crazy 
lady fated to be ignored. 13 The idea that speech was given to all comes into 
question. 
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Against a vast mythic scene that foregrounds a complex history of ideas 
about speech, we come to Aristotle and his treatise Rhetoric. In this book, we 
are not drawn to Aristotle's text and the traditions that it encompasses as an 
"ever receding horizon." 14 Rather, we are drawn to what is assumed. The 
prominent assumptions are that Aristotle couches rhetoric in relation to a 
distinctive human capacity of reason and logic to navigate with practical 
wisdom the contingencies of civic life. By doing so, rhetoric is theorized as 
governing deliberation and decision making in the contingent realms of poli-
tics, law, and culture. Based on such assumptions, rhetoric seems inclusive of 
all participation and thus is dubbed "the people art." Such assumptions offer 
a neutral view of the art as a form of civic engagement. 
For this, rhetoric is celebrated. A recognizable trend in recent political 
theories of democracy, in particular deliberative democracy, is a tum toward 
what political theorist Iris Marion Young calls "some positive political [pur-
poses] of rhetoric." 15 For Young, a rhetorical perspective exposes the false 
belief that political deliberation is a coolly and purely rational activity. In 
discovering rhetoric, Young discovers a tradition of resistance to the Platonic 
privilege of reason over emotion. Why move away from a rational paradigm 
of political communication? The reason lies, as Young notes, in the fiction of 
rationality's claim to be "impartial and dispassionate," thereby transcending 
the "dirty world of interest and passion." 16 As Young argues, to the extent 
that democratic theory and practice privilege "allegedly dispassionate, llflsit-
uated, neutral reason, it has exclusionary implications." 17 The tum toward 
rhetoric, according to Yollflg, allows at once a tum toward inclusion, for 
rhetoric can be used to get an issue on the agenda for deliberation, to fashion 
claims to people and people to claims, and to motivate the move from reason 
to judgment. In short, the deliberative tum in democracy makes room for 
rhetorical dimensions of commllflication that accompany all deliberation, and 
in the development of this room that has been Uflderused, participatory inclu-
sion can be forged. 
Likewise, Danielle Allen's Talking with Strangers offers Aristotelian rhe-
torical theory to political theorists of democracy. After exposing anew, in 
light of race tension and history, the problems with U.S. democracy in creat-
ing a willing minority, Allen proposes rhetoric as the solution: using an 
Aristotelian rhetoric, our invention of pluralistic, friend-based, civic speech 
will be enhanced. In this vein, Chantal Mouffe's theory of an agonistic poli-
tics can be read as a call for a reconnection of politics to the great tradition of 
rhetoric. 18 Advancing the notion of democratic deliberation being a primarily 
rhetorical activity, Robert Ivie quotes Chantal Mouffe's call "to re-create in 
politics the connection with the great tradition of rhetoric." 19 For I vie, a la 
Mouffe, this connection is an emancipatory means for fostering democracy 
for it fosters a robust and rowdy democracy, rooted in classical notions of 
conflict (agon), yet situated, as Allen idealizes, in political friendship. 
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Questions of inclusion, however, vex this scene of rhetoric. While rheto-
ric might be the people's art, not all are included. The Athenian democracy, 
the cultural situation of Aristotle's rhetorical theory, was, in terms of its time, 
inclusive of all. Yet, the "all" of Aristotelian rhetorical theory and Athenian 
democracy does not include women, let alone slaves, or foreign-born men 
residing in Athens. The "all" means in the main Athenian-born men. Where-
as damning the Greeks for their nominal-only inclusive "all" would be 
anachronistic, calling out the contemporary legacy of using "all" in demo-
cratic speech in a nominal-only way would not be. The mask of inclusivity is 
more complicated than mere demographics: the problem of nominal inclusiv-
ity in ancient Greek rhetorical culture did not go away once others were 
invited to the deliberative sphere. Of late, this is evinced in scholarship in the 
history of rhetoric with particular consideration given to U.S. immigration 
practices and policies. 20 
Clearly, we are not the first to notice this problem. Beginning in the 
1980s, feminists, in particular, from a variety of disciplines across the hu-
manities have asked many questions and have challenged rhetoric's terms of 
inclusion. 21 In the main, critiques and challenges among twentieth-century 
century.philosophers, feminists, and rhetoricians issue a call to pay attention 
to the ways in which rhetorical theory functions traditionally to exclude or 
deny women, rendering rhetoric effectively and paradoxically less than dem-
ocratic. The judicious course, of which Doris Yoakum's and Lillian O' Con-
ner's work took the lead, was to consider how rhetoric could be theorized to 
include women. 22 
Generally speaking, we join the conversation with those who critique and 
challenge rhetoric's history, theory, and practice. 23 The "Third Sophistic" 
movement in rhetoric beginning in the 1980s was devoted to seeing rhetoric 
historically and theoretically in relation to the other, who appears in various 
forms as woman, alien, barbarian, stranger, or what Victor J. Vitanza calls 
the "the third man" or "the third woman." Broadly speaking, "the third" 
designates who or what must be excluded. This is so because within rheto-
ric's history there "is that which must be excluded," as Michelle Ballif ex-
plains Vitanza. 24 If there is one common theme among revisionary historio-
graphical work of the past thirty years, it can be found in the phrase "must be 
excluded." Exclusion in no way suggests that some are in rhetoric and some 
are not. Rather, the "the third 'is symptomatic of the logic of the dialec-
tic. '"25 Notwithstanding the sustained and growing research in this area, the 
question of rhetoric's relationship to the question of inclusion is difficult to 
contend with for those who assume a neutral art. 26 
Those who assume rhetoric's neutrality are in a position to see its beauty 
and power as a force of democratic deliberation and therefore promote rheto-
ric for its values pertinent to participatory inclusion. To assume the art is 
neutral is to impose upon the other a rhetoric that transcends or denies lived 
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experiences. As such, those who are systematically excluded from rhetoric 
are invited or required to participate in the decision-making process by using 
a seemingly neutral tool yet one that established their exclusion and other-
ness. Any involvement in rhetoric, whether for the sake of history or the sake 
of democratic deliberation, means that "we" have an obligation to the ex-
cluded. 27 For us, this obligation requires primarily asking two questions: 
How is contact configured? What resources are available within the rhetori-
cal tradition for broadening and varying its present configuration? 
The rhetoric that many celebrate and strive to renew for the sake of civic 
engagement is, at once, designed to function best by seeking to exclude what 
it cannot contain or control dialectically. Thus women and others are ex-
cluded by peculiar functionalities of rhetoric that mostly are celebrated pre-
cisely when they adhere to qualities of dialectical logic that permitted rheto-
ric to emerge productively to bring contingency under control. This may 
seem odd, and rightly so. That contingency is the invariable scene of rhetoric 
is axiomatic in the field of rhetoric studies, from Aristotle to modem day. 
Perhaps because of its axiomatic status, contingency has not had a great deal 
of attention paid to it by rhetorical theorists. Contingency remains the un-
problematic and invariable scene of rhetoric in scholarly writings on the idea. 
From this scene of contingency, the trajectory of scholarship takes off, in a 
celebration of this art of navigating contingency that we call rhetoric. 
We begin again near the beginning of Aristotle's Rhetoric. Tracing what 
he calls the "contingency thesis" in the history of rhetoric, Dilip Gaonkar 
locates its genius in Aristotle's domicile of deliberation, defining contingen-
cy in terms of recurrence, not randomness, and thus effectively fusing it to 
probability. Quoting Aristotle, Gaonkar says, "A Probability is a thing that 
usually happens; not ... anything whatever that usually happens, but only if 
it belongs to the class of the 'contingent' or 'variable. "'28 With this defini-
tion, Aristotle creates two types of contingencies. There is contingency asso-
ciated with probability, and there is a contingency associated with the acci-
dental or random contingencies-sumbebekos. Aristotle expunges random 
contingences from rhetoric. 
Rhetoric seeks out in any subject those concepts and ideas which are 
probable to a class or group. Rhetoric perceives probabilities; it does not 
create them. With this in mind, Gaonkar tracks the contingency thesis to 
twentieth-century rhetoricians such as Lloyd Bitzer and Thomas Farrell, 
showing how they adhere to probability as contingency, situating delibera-
tion in relation to "public knowledge" and "social knowledge." In parallel 
fashion, Gaonkar observes how the new rhetoricians, like Kenneth Burke, 
and the post foundationalists, like Judith Butler, adhere to the contingency 
thesis, mostly by importing Aristotle's notion of probability to the scene of 
"practice." This is not to say that post-foundationalists are Aristotelians. 
Rather, they deploy the notion of contingency without "adequately thematiz-
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ing it"29 and, ironically, facilitate the remaking of the foundation they sought 
to escape. Aristotle and post-foundationalists both celebrate contingency in 
the same way, albeit the post-foundationalists do not know it. 
The axiom of rhetoric being an art of navigating contingency in public 
life prefigures the expulsion of the other, of radical contingency. That part of 
the contingent that falls outside of the doxa gets expunged, discarded, ren-
dered invisible and without authority. And this is why we write. As it turned 
out, over these years of our relationship, the most intriguing aspect of our 
conversations about contingency led us to a place wherein we eventually set 
aside the prevalent view of rhetoric and contingency. Rather, in the course of 
our many talks we were invited by each other's perspective to consider how 
rhetoric defines contingency and then relies on that definition to prefigure 
relations with the other in such a way as to implicate exclusion of difference 
through a rhetoric designed to function coherently with modes of argument. 
Our various turns in this book work to move contingency toward acci-
dent, otherness, alienation, generation, wonder, estrangement, natality. Col-
lectively, we write with aspirations of democratic relations conceived 
through an expansive view of contingency because it enables us to configure 
contact with the other alliostrophically. Derived from the movement, or 
strophe, of the other, alloiosis, an alloiostrophic rhetoric is the precondition 
for staging contact with the other in terms that the tradition of rhetoric, the 
one which we had put aside, expunged from its own theoretical purview. 
What was left remained an unproblematized contingency. We explore this 
remainder using tropes. 
We write this book as a call to revolutionize rhetorical theory via tropes. 
This book contributes to the theorization of rhetoric anew by first calling 
attention to a multiplicity of tropes of difference in the remainders of contin-
gency-what Aristotle expelled due to his beliefs about change and his or-
ientation to the earth. The trope of difference offers something new-a new 
mode of contact with the other that does not depend on moving, controlling 
or turning the other down. Our wager is that a book written to introduce the 
trope of difference to the field also offers an awaiting opportunity by which 
rhetoric can imagine haptic relations between people in terms of difference 
and re-invent itself to emerge in democracy as an art of the people. 
To get started on this project, we turn to methodological considerations 
that started with our study of tropes. In the past fifty years, tropes and figures 
have acquired a status akin to a methodology. 30 Tropes need not be and have 
not always been defined exclusively in terms of individual bits. They can be 
organized in systems. Classically speaking, rhetoric consists of four systems 
of change; each system is formed by and affects the world through corre-
sponding tropes that enable the kind of change the system intends. These four 
systems of change, known as the quadripartita ratio, are substitution, sub-
traction, addition, and transposition. For the sake of convenience, we preview 
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four systems of change. Table 0.1 31 identifies and differentiates them by 
giving their Greek name followed by examples of tropes that satisfy the 
condition of change of each category. 
Our methodology is derived from these four categories of change but we 
reorganize them and create two operating systems. In particular, we see in 
rhetoric two operating systems that we call substitution and transmutation. 
Each system, being tropological, is identifiable in terms of form and function 
by its relation with change. The systems of operation reveal their form and 
function by the kinds of change they enact. Operating systems reveal their 
intended use and functionality through a trope or tropes to provide a way to 
apprehend the system holistically. 
We were prompted to reorganize the quadripartita ratio through our anal-
ysis of tropes in relation to change defined in the context of an earth at rest. 
The system of substitution utilizes change and motion in terms of the princi-
ple ofrest. To tip it another way, the tropes within the system of substitution 
all, to varying degrees, turn down. Its governing figures and tropes are in the 
range of synonym, metaphor, and antistrophe. 
Here is how we look at rhetoric after changing the way we looked at 
things. The operating systems we looked at changed from being a quadripar-
tita ratio, flat and impartially related to conceptualizations of change-to a 
double operating system-substitution and transmutation-matching and 
mirroring rhetoric's bifurcation of change-contingency/probable and con-
tingency/sumbebekos or random contingency. As such, the operating system 
of substitution is the frontal system of change. It is prefigured by tropes of 
substitution such as antistrophe and is in direct contact with systems of 
change that prefigure difference. Working in the parameters of how change 
happens on an earth at rest, the frontal system enacts the work of the ruler or 
mover. Based on the logic of antistrophe within the theoretical parameters of 
an earth at rest, the frontal system turns down the other systems of change. 
Specifically, we present the system operating through the tropical sequence 
Table0.1. Rhetorical Systems of Change 
Substitution Subtraction Addition 
Kata enallagen Kataaneian Kata 
pleonasmon 
synonymia syncope epitheton 
anaco/outha meiosis metaplasm 
acyrologia anesis polysyndeton 
Transposition 
Kata metathesin 
apostrophe 
tmesis 
al/oiosis 
Adapted from Gideon 0. Burton, ''Silva Rhctoricac." cf. Quintilian 5.38. 
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"antistrophe-katastrophe," as it is inscribed in a static model where change is 
orchestrated. 
The other operating system we call transmutation involves not one but 
three systems of change. Comprising tropes of subtraction, addition, and 
transposition, the system of transmutation appears to correspond to a great 
deal of ideas commonly associated with contingency. By virtue of the second 
operating system of tropes, of which al/oiosis is one, its force seemingly 
conflicts with the nonns of change associated with an earth at rest. This trope 
does not work in isolation: it involves three other systems of change and does 
so for good reason. 
In an effort to explain why three types of change are crucial for the 
operating system of transmutation to engage difference, we consider what 
happens if only change by addition is employed. Addition in a system of 
substitution has been used as a strategy of including women in the history of 
rhetoric. There are at least two explanations for why addition does not work 
as a system of change capable of including the other or re-theorizing rhetoric 
in a manner that establishes a logic, tropologically speaking, through differ-
ence. Barbara A. Biesecker, for example, compares adding women's ne-
glected, lost, or forgotten writings to history to rhetoric's affinnative action 
approach. She writes, "Despite its ostensible purpose-to move toward 
multiculturalism by adding new items to an ever-expanding list of 'great 
works' -the affinnative action agenda conserves the putative authority of the 
center by granting· it license to continue to produce official explanations in 
the designation of what is and what is not worthy of inclusion."32 In House of 
My Sojourn, Sutton demonstrates how adding women's bodies to the house 
of rhetoric creates the technological condition of their exclusion because the 
space is designed with tropical resources to add women by subtracting them. 
In both cases, adding results in exclusion due to the force of the system of 
substitution. Its force can be shown to exist whether one takes the critical 
view of history from without and in relation to public policy or whether one 
takes the critical view of theory from within and in relation to rhetoric's 
technological impact on the body, the doer, and speaker in the civic realm. 
All of this is to say that our project is not committed to opening rhetoric to 
difference through addition, whether the addition of difference is articulated 
in a multicultural sense or implicated in a technical sense by adding the trope 
of a/loiosis to rhetorical theory. We are theorizing a transmutational change, 
one that cuts across all known forms to an otherwise unknown form that 
serves the ends of democratic life. As long as we remain invested in change 
as substitution then we remain committed to the other in a particular mode of 
contact that "we" are trying to move beyond. 
Returning to the four types of change (Table 0.1 ), and summarizing how 
we configure the complexity of the two operating systems, the system of 
substitution is invested in one type of change, namely substitution, while 
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transmutation involves the participation and interaction of three kinds of 
change-subtraction, addition, and transposition. Table 0.2 depicts the oper-
ating systems and connects them to the kind of change they embrace. 
We return to the beginning of our introduction where we talked about 
rhetoric in the context of democratic deliberation and revisionary views of it. 
All agree that revising rhetoric is a project devoted to change. Our trope 
project calls for a revolution because change requires a new methodology. A 
new methodology is indispensable for deciphering how the turn toward dif-
ference can utilize resources that have been deferred, deflected, or dimin-
ished. Rhetoric's "other tropes" and the ability to mobilize resources fonna-
tive of contingency untethered to probability must be equal to rhetoric's 
power to restrict change with the trope of antistrophe fonnative of speaking 
practices. 
From a methodological point of view, the broad aim of this book is to 
take a look at both operations in tenns of how they function and to consider 
what each operation can tell us about rhetoric's formal relation to the other as 
well as how this relation implicates rhetorical theory's ability to act as a 
resource for democratic deliberation, to engage contingency, and to effect 
democratic change. It is worth mentioning that the word "theory" comes 
from the Greek word theorein, a word referring to seeing and observing. So 
our view of rhetoric and the terms and definitions we employ are derived 
from seeing the art from a theoretical standpoint. By introducing definitions 
and new concepts and tropes, we are equipped to make visible or more 
accurately to theorize rhetoric performing democratic deliberation as it could 
be. The future of rhetoric is open to democratic deliberation. The vision of 
democratic deliberation as it has informed the imagination of many is one 
such future. There are others. 
Our methodology also raises theoretical considerations with respect to the 
two operating systems of change. Could the tripartite system held by the 
operating system of transmutation replace the static model? The problem, as 
we grasp it, is not to return rhetoric to its original domain; the problem is to 
recognize where the original domain no longer serves the professed aims of 
deliberative democracy. Could the tripartite system be inscribed alongside 
the "antistrophic-katastrophic" sequence to effectively produce a metamor-
phosis not only to radically alter how the "antistrophic-katastrophic" se-
Table 0.2. Operating Systems Distinguished by Type(s) of Change 
Operating System of 
Substitution 
Operating System of Transmutation 
Substitution Subtraction Addition Transposition 
Adapted from Rhetorical Systems of Change 
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quence functions but also mutate the static model, rendering it dynamic? 
These questions are already exceeding this book, but not our "trope project." 
The future of rhetoric requires a forward-looking impetus that directs us 
to seek rhetoric's relation with a multiplicity of tropes not as ornaments or 
disembodied general stylistic devices but as embodied perfonnances that are 
pre-figurative and operative in the functioning of rhetoric. What we offer in 
this book is both new yet ancient, albeit left tmattended and de-authorized for 
too long. For the plainest evidence of its ancientness, we can tum to a stan-
dard text of the classical rhetorical tradition, Heinrich Lausberg's A Hand-
book of Literary Rhetoric. Using this reference, widely recognized as a pre-
eminent handbook of classical rhetoric, we can discern that tropes in classical 
rhetorical theory were theorized to deviate from "correct" usage, including 
accepted usage and normal usage. Tropes tum away from the nonnal. The 
normal is what needs escaping, and tropes provide the means of escape. In 
particular, deviation, which tropes offer, makes liberation possible. 
The antistrophic figure of rhetoric is a case in point. With this trope, 
Aristotle deviated from the past and liberated rhetoric for its systematization. 
Now antistrophe has become the front-face of meaning making. However, it 
is just one trope. We should do more than just amplify this one trope in our 
rhetorical theorizing. We have attended before to the front face of the rela-
tional dynamic between rhetoric and democracy, what we once called "the 
face work of freedom-the face of freedom's discourse."33 Drawing from 
Henri Lefebvre, we see these excessive amplifications of the face distort and 
brutalize the situation34 and prevent the possibility of contingency and differ-
ence. Thus, the alloiostrophic tum must go in many ways to return to the 
meaning-making process (because no one has yet figured out how to escape 
that return), bringing with it renewed energy that has the capacity for trans-
formation. 
This book is devoted to developing the affective, positive and dynamic 
structure of the operating system of transmutation by introducing a trope 
called al/oiosis, meaning difference, diversity and strangeness. A quite other 
trope, alloiosis provides a unique vantage point for taking a closer look at 
how, through three systems of change, it could sustain an operating system 
associated with democracy without enacting systemic exclusions. At the 
same time, al/oiosis offers a methodology-an "a//oio-rhetorics"-for ex-
panding rhetoric through quite other tropological resources that open it to 
making contact with difference. At this point in time, the methodology is a 
quest for a style ofrhetoric that reflects the complexities of the process of the 
operating systems of change. 
Toward that end, a new theorization of rhetoric must be formed in a 
milieu within and around multiplicity and a complexity of change where new 
concepts and new ways of making contact can be shaped. This bears repeat-
ing: It is not enough to build a new theory on one system of change. 
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To transform rhetoric in relation to change is not to theorize how the other 
operates in a system of rhetoric that authorizes contingency to be conceived 
in the double context of probability and the accidental, not in a static model 
of rhetoric. To say that the earth is not at rest and neither should be rhetoric is 
to offer an opportunity to configure contingency otherwise. More important-
ly, the impact of this new configuration creates a trope of difference and thus 
invents a way to begin a new conversation about how to turn toward the other 
as opposed to turning down the other. Toward that end, we organized the 
book in the following way. 
In the first chapter, we deconstruct the figure of traditional rhetorical 
theory as antistrophic. In doing so, we expose how rhetorical theory is tradi-
tionally designed to turn down possibilities in the meaning-making process 
so that a position of rest can be achieved in agreement of all, or at least the 
majority, or the wise. Turning down such possibilities might require a wealth 
of rhetorical resources, and these resources can even sanction strangeness 
from time to time, as Kennerly in chapter 5 astutely shows Aristotle doing in 
his treatment of style in Book Ill and as Danielle Allen does in her examina-
tion of Aristotle's rhetorical art of learning how to talk to strangers. Nonethe-
less, change can only go so far if rhetoric hasn't been revolutionized beyond 
its antistrophic figuration. We show that this need to turn otherwise can be 
theorized through the figure of al/oiostrophe wherein alienation is essential 
to transformation. 
Next, we offer four etudes with our theory of alloiostrophic rhetoric. Jane 
Sutton works alloiostrophically to take us through change and contingency in 
the Physics and also, as a consequence, in the Rhetoric, as she takes the two 
to be part of an integrated corpus of Aristotle's works. Through her study of 
the Physics, she helps us to see that Aristotle bifurcates contingency into that 
part aligned with the probable and that part aligned with the accidental. The 
probable (eikos) is that which is likely the case. The accidental (sumbebekos) 
is that which is neither always nor for the most part. In this bifurcation of 
contingency into the accidental and the probable, the probable is privileged. 
This privilege then generates necessity, or better yet, produces another gener-
ation of necessity, the doxastic generation. This generation is not pure neces-
sity, but rather probability, which is the closest the political realm can get to 
necessity, and which must function in civic discourse in place of necessity. 
Sutton's work with Physics and Rhetoric exposes that change or contingency 
is a critical feature of rhetorical theory, but nevertheless, both change and 
contingency function within an economy of an earth at rest. This means 
expanding contingency by denying an earth at rest, which ought to be easy 
enough as other disciplines-physics and psychology, 35 for example-have 
already benefited greatly from their Copernican turns. Once we get on board 
with the idea that neither the earth nor rhetoric is at rest, we are free to use 
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the resources in Aristotle to imagine rhetoric in a way that is indebted to him 
but also free of him. 
Hobeika's parataxis of alloiosis is itself alloiotic, as hypotaxis has for a 
long time now been the norm of meaning making in scholarly analysis and 
argument. Parataxis, characterized by the absence of overt logical connec-
tors between ideas, leaves us wondering at meaning. Kennerly's essay shows 
forth the wonder of wonder such as when Homer tells of how Priam and 
Achilles, in states of wonder at each other, structure a space of trust and 
friendship, and how, in this space, Achilles' anger is resolved. Wonder 
sparks self-awareness and solidarity. In meaning making, fresh energy is 
created by alienation, estrangement, and awe. 
Playing on such energy, Hobeika's paratactic display of alloiosis alien-
ates and thereby transforms the reader by way of making impossible (by way 
of not expressing connections, relations, making arguments, drawing conclu-
sions) easy, hence restful, senses of things. Hobeika's parataxis of al/oiosis 
alienates readers from the norm and opens up a wondering of what these 
ancient flashes of texts are, mean, do, and offer. Parataxis is an irony in a 
run-on style: it can slow down meaning, holding us in wonder with no overt 
logic, and no easy or ready rendering of meaning. Yet, now we are free to 
start playing, imagining, theorizing. 
As Kennerly shrewdly discerns, a/loiostrophic estrangement makes pos-
sible the freedom to wonder and to be born for others, hence she calls alloios-
trophic rhetoric, too, alloiotrophic. The generative potential of alienation and 
estrangement has a redemptive effect. We know such a redemptive effect, 
from Kenneth Burke, as comic in genre and attitude. 36 
Mifsud invites us to wonder in many ways, first at the mechanisms of 
correctness as a trope used to excise texts from the rhetorical tradition, then 
at a peculiar text that she proposes ought to be made contact with differently, 
[Plutarch] Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer. From this wondering she 
is resourced well to wonder some more, next at Aristophanes' rhetorical 
redemption by way of alloiotic gendered performances of gift-giving. This 
redemption is transmutative, changing war to peace, misogyny to equality, 
and enmity to solidarity, ending in lots oflove and dancing. 
Collectively, the energies of transmutation contained in these chapters 
evoke the question, does anything go? Sutton's Afterword asks this very 
question. There is no simple answer. It requires reflecting on the two operat-
ing systems ofrhetoric in terms of agent and agency. Is it possible to imagine 
rhetoric consisting of two operating systems, rather than one? Yes. There is 
Abraham Lincoln's fragment on Niagara Falls, which offers a vantage point 
for theorizing the other as a concept central to democracy. There is Julia 
Kristeva's depiction of the chora: The operating systems could be tropes set 
in the womb, engendering ways of thinking about contact not only in terms 
of the inclusion of the other, as is typical in critiques of classical theories, but 
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in terms of what inclusion of the other can offer to the retheorization of 
rhetoric. Lincoln and Kristeva are a start. There are others, as an exercise in a 
riddle even provokes us to reconsider Aristotle. 
All told, this book is what it means to be open to alloiostrophic rhetoric. 
To be open is to be positioned to invent. To paraphrase Aristotle's conclusion 
to the Rhetoric, I am done, but you are not. This time there are no gods, like 
Zeus, to deliver rhetoric anew for the kind of democracy we deserve. 
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